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Research on worry during the past 15 years has revealed a remarkable amount of knowledge about 
this pervasive human phenomenon. Worry involves a predominance of verbal thought activity, 
functions as a type of cognitive avoidance, and inhibits emotional processing. Worry also produces 
not only anxious experience but depressive affect as well. Recent evidence suggests that the very 
private experience of worry is developmentally connected to enmeshed childhood relationships with 
the primary caregiver and is currently associated with significant interpersonal problems, especially 
those involving tendency to be overly nurturing to others. At the physiological level, worry is 
characterized peripherally by parasympathetic deficiency and autonomic rigidity and centrally by 
left-frontal activation. 




Worry is a common human experience. Everyone worries every once in a while. When it 
becomes excessive, uncontrollable, and chronically present, however, the constant discomfort, 
disruption, and loss of joy in life can become intolerable and may result in a condition known 
diagnostically as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) whose central characteristic is chronic worry 
[see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.), abbreviated DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994]. 
Despite the commonplace nature of worry, systematic investigation devoted to 
understanding the phenomenon did not begin until the early 1980s. Prior to that time, most of the 
available research came from the test anxiety literature, wherein the distinction was made between 
the cognitive (or worry) components of anxiety and its emotional (or physiological) components. 
Significantly, correlational studies indicated that it was the former, and not the latter, elements that 
predicted poor test performance and low grade point average (cf. Deffenbacher, 1980; Hembree, 
1988; Seipp, 1991). Our own research group became interested in worry as a consequence of earlier 
research on insomnia and its treatment that found relationships similar to those determined for test 
anxiety. A series of investigations ultimately led to the conclusion that many psychologically based 
insomnias were caused, not by peripheral physiological hyperactivity as had been previously 
supposed (Monroe, 1967), but by intrusive cognitive activity at bedtime (cf. Borkovec, 1979). A 
significant portion of that cognitive activity seemed to be best described as worrying, and not 
surprisingly the topic about which insomniacs most often worried was whether or not they would be 
able to get to sleep that night. 
Since the early 1980s, research on worry has grown considerably, and a great deal has been 
learned about its nature, functions, consequences, and origins. There is one remarkable feature 
associated with this area of investigation that is worthy of comment, a feature likely due to its 
relative newcomer status in the scientific domain. Increasingly in recent years, psychology has been 
viewing human beings are nonlinear dynamical systems involving the moment-to-moment 
interactions among multiple levels of responding (e.g., attentional, conceptual, imaginal, affective, 
physiological, and behavioral) to constantly changing environments. What we think affects how we 
feel, what we feel affects how we think, how we think and feel affect how we behave, how we 
behave affects how we feel, etc. Thus, although it is often necessary to go deeply into the 
investigation of particular systems (as often seen in cognitive psychology, psychology of emotions, 
and psychophysiology) to learn intimate things about their operation, eventually we will need to 
WORRY 3 
 
return to the whole individual, realizing that everything connects to everything else. Research has 
found that worry is associated with distinctive characteristics in each of these various systems. 
Thus, continued investigation of worry can potentially tell a great deal us about the mutually 
interactive influences of these processes in human beings. 
The present article has two, related goals. First, we wish to describe those distinctive 
processes in various response systems that are characteristic of worry and that may make up the 
elements of a dynamical relationship that possibly underlies its occurrence. Second, we will attempt 
to show how these interactive elements may contribute to the maintenance, persistence, and even 
strengthening of this distressing activity. 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF WORRY: PREDOMINANCE OF THOUGHT, 
COGNITIVE AVOIDANCE, AND THE INHIBITION OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSING 
Descriptively, worry involves a predominance of negatively valenced verbal thought 
activity. When we worry, we are talking to ourselves a lot about negative things, most often about 
negative events that we are afraid might happen in the future. Imagery is less noticed in worry. The 
first demonstration of this dominance of thought came from comparisons of mental samples 
obtained from GAD clients and control participants during self-relaxation and worry induction 
periods (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Nonanxious people reported mostly positive imagery and little 
thought during relaxation, whereas GAD clients reported equal amounts of thoughts and images, 
both of which were negative in emotional tone. When asked to worry about a current concern, a 
shift to a marked predominance of negative thought over images occurred for both groups. 
Importantly, successful therapy changed the clients' thought/imagery ratios; they were no longer 
different from those of nonanxious people. 
The distinction between the two cognitive phenomena of thought and imagery is of crucial 
functional importance for understanding their respective roles in emotional disturbance and its 
treatment. Verbal thoughts about emotional material elicit very little cardiovascular response, 
whereas images of the same material evoke significantly greater response (Vrana, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1986). Moreover, people spontaneously use verbalization as a strategy for abstraction, 
disengagement, and emotion control that can decrease sympathetic arousal to aversive material 
(Tucker & Newman, 1981). The abstract conceptual system, including the verbal system, is 
therefore less closely connected to efferent command into affective, physiological, and behavioral 
systems than images are. 
The relative isolation of the verbal system is evolutionarily significant, because it gives 
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humans a capability to inhibit responding, to search memory, and to experiment in the mind with 
different possible responses without immediate environmental consequence. If every thought we 
ever had was immediately expressed, successful adaptation (especially interpersonal) would be very 
difficult, and environmental and social punishment would be frequent. So having a thought system 
that is somewhat remote from other systems is adaptive. However, this feature has a potential 
negative consequence for any emotional disorder that is characterized by thought predominance. It 
means that emotional processing will be inhibited, and thus negative emotional meaning and 
emotional disturbance will be maintained. As Foa and Kozak (1986) have argued, for repeated 
exposures to phobic stimuli to be therapeutic, it is necessary that complete emotional processing of 
fear-related material occur. Absence of physiological response during the presentation of emotional 
material is taken as evidence that the entire fear structure stored in memory has not been accessed 
and that extinction will therefore not take place. We have to confront not only feared situations to 
overcome our fear of them, but we also have to feel the fear during the confrontations. Interestingly, 
Mowrer's (1947) two-stage theory of anxiety, upon which so much of modern behavior therapy was 
based in its development of therapeutic exposure techniques, explicitly stated that the conditioned 
response is part of the conditioned stimulus. Exposure to the response-produced cues of the 
conditioned response is therefore an important element of extinction process. If, then, worry is 
predominantly thought and if thought is a poor vehicle for processing emotional information for the 
sake of changing emotional meanings, then worrisome ways of dealing with emotional material 
may actively inhibit emotional processing and create maintaining conditions for emotional 
disturbance. In this functional way, worry may be a type of cognitive avoidance to perceived 
dangers. 
If worry partly functions as a cognitive avoidance response to threatening stimuli, what 
might worry be trying to avoid? There may be several functional levels to this question. 
Worry Suppresses Somatic Anxiety 
At a short-term level, we do know that worry suppresses cardiovascular response to 
threatening images. Speech-anxious participants who engage in worrisome thinking just prior to 
phobic image presentations show no cardiovascular response at all to the images. On the other hand, 
participants who think relaxing thoughts or neutral thoughts do show significant heart rate reactions 
to the images, with the relaxation condition showing signs of extinction during repeated exposures 
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). Furthermore, the amount of thinking taking place during worry predicts the 
extent to which such physiological responses are muted (Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Diehl, 
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1993). "Cogito, ergo I can suppress affect." If worry as an avoidance response does immediately 
suppress somatic/affective aspects of anxious experience, it may thereby be negatively reinforced. 
At this point, how worry provides this suppression is speculative. It may involve the actual 
suppression of aversive images, but this seems unlikely. Worry may well prime catastrophic images 
so that they happen at an increased frequency during a worrisome episode. It is more likely that 
worrisome thinking is the immediate cognitive avoidance response to such images when they do 
occur. The demonstrated suppressive effects of worry on somatic anxiety could also be due to the 
fact that worry uses up significant amounts of attentional resource (Mathews, 1990), is difficult to 
shift away from (Parkinson & Rachman, 1981), insulates its thoughts from affective meaning 
through the semantic satiation inherent in its repetitive verbal activity (Smith, 1984), and creates 
less mismatch between information expected and • information received (Gray, 1982). 
One recent finding may represent a further key for understanding how worry affects 
imagery: Worrisome thought is characterized by reduced concreteness. Research conducted within 
the framework of the dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1986) has demonstrated that generating images 
from abstract (as compared to concrete) words and sentences requires greater time and produces 
images that are more abstract and less vivid. Whether abstract or concrete, however, verbal thoughts 
and images are always processed integratively (Paivio & Marschark, 1991). Thus, if worry involves 
thought, it can still prime catastrophic images. Yet, if worrisome thought is abstract, the associated 
imagery will be less vivid and therefore less intrusive and attention-grabbing. Being of reduced 
concreteness, worrisome thought would not suppress imagery but would merely activate images 
that are less concrete and vivid. This reasoning would also explain why research participants have 
reported lessened imagery after the experimental induction of worry (Borkovec & Inz, 1990); it is 
harder to detect or easier to ignore. In sum, worriers may escape fearful imagery by focusing on the 
verbal channel while thinking about the future in more abstract terms, e.g., "something awful will 
happen," with few concrete details. 
In support of this line of reasoning, Stöber (1997) has demonstrated that worrisome thought 
is indeed less concrete. Participants in these studies selected topics about which they did and did not 
worry and then elaborated on the problems present in these topics by listing possible risks and 
negative consequences. For example, job loss could be a risk for a financial worry, and moving into 
a smaller apartment could be one of its negative consequences. All answers were rated for 
concreteness and imagery by independent judges. Elaborations on worry topics were found to be of 
lower concrete ness and lessened imagery quality than for nonworry topics. Moreover, the more 
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participants worried about the topic, the less concrete and imagery-eliciting were the associated 
problem elaborations. This outcome suggests that, in response to initial aversive images, worry 
might mitigate the vividness of further negative images and thereby mute physiological reaction to 
their occurrence. 
Regardless of how the suppression of affect occurs, the most significant consequence for 
worry's avoidant function and preclusion of emotional processing is that anxious meanings are 
maintained. Worry is in this way no different from Mowrer's (1947) behavioral avoidance of phobic 
stimuli in its functions and consequences: Despite creating conditions that restrict the individual's 
life and/or generate other kinds of disturbance, s/he can reduce some distressing experiences by 
avoiding their source. As in Mowrer's theory, however, maintenance of fear is the consequence. 
It has also been found that worry that precedes exposures to actual (instead of imaginal) 
phobic events generates a somewhat different process that results all the same in a similar 
perseveration of anxious meanings. Although worry just prior to actual speech presentations does 
not inhibit the cardiovascular response of speech phobics, subjective anxiety increases upon 
repetitious exposures (Hazlett-Stevens, 1997b). Speech phobics who relax or engaged in neutral 
activity prior to each exposure, on the other hand, show declines in anxious experience. Moreover, 
worrying just after exposure to a stressor increases cognitive intrusions about the stressor over the 
subsequent three days, whereas imaginal rehearsals of the stressor or merely neutral conditions just 
after the stress event do not generate such intrusions (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995). Thus, worry 
before or after emotional events precludes adaptive processing of the material and contributes to a 
maintenance or even an increase in the emotional disturbance generated by those events. 
Worry as an Attempt to Avoid Negative Events or to Prepare for the Worst 
At a second, more long-term level of identifying the source of worry's cognitive avoidance 
function, people do attribute avoidant functions to their worrying, and there may be good reasons 
for these attributions. The highest rated reasons for worrying given by both GAD and nonanxious 
individuals are that (a) it helps them discover ways of avoiding negative future events and (b) it 
prepares them for the worst if they cannot avoid it (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). Eysenck (1992) has 
presented a cognitive model of worry process that captures these phenomena. In his model, worry 
had three major functions: alarm, prompt, and preparation. Upon external or internal detection of 
threat, the alarm function introduces information about the threat into awareness. The prompt 
function then brings threat-related thoughts and images from long-term memory into conscious 
awareness. The preparation function finally permits the individual to anticipate negative scenarios 
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of the future (catastrophizing). This function allows him/her to initiate anticipatory coping either by 
acting to prevent the anticipated negative developments (prevention) or by preparing for the 
expected negative consequences (anticipatory coping). Eysenck conceded that the evidence for the 
third function is rather inconsistent. However, the findings that worry is associated with problem 
elaborations of reduced concreteness (Stöber, 1997) may provide a basis for it. When forming 
internal task models and action plans for prevention and preparation, concreteness is a crucial 
variable (Schönpflug, 1989). Abstract models are unlikely to lead to concrete actions. Worry, 
characterized by low concreteness, is unlikely to provide a solid basis for the implementation of 
concrete steps for coping with the problem. Without the selection of an appropriate coping strategy, 
the threat is preserved, and worry continues. 
Still, it is understandable that worriers may think that worry involves anticipatory problem 
solving when one considers the situation commonly faced by someone in the midst of a worrisome 
episode. S/he is detecting threat cues that warn of some possible future catastrophe. Detection of 
threat naturally generates a primitive fight-or-flight response. Because the threat refers to a 
nonexistent future and is frequently about events that cannot be controlled and are not going to 
happen anyway (cf. Borkovec & Newman, in press), there is no one to fight and no where to flee. 
The threat still exists in the person's mind, and s/he therefore remains convinced that it must be 
avoided. In this circumstance, mentally trying to determine how to avoid the threat or to prepare for 
its occurrence remains as one of the few coping responses available. 
A final way in which worry may function as avoidance at this long-term level is found in the 
superstitious reinforcement paradigm inherent in its occurrence. Because very few things about 
which people worry actually turn out bad, the majority of worry is eventually negatively reinforced 
by the nonoccurrence of the feared events. This environmental contingency may well be the 
foundation for reports by people that they worry because it feels as if the worrying makes the 
occurrence of the feared event less likely, even though they admit that no logical connection exists 
(Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). 
Although rather straightforward applications of Mowrer's two-stage learning theory of fear 
and avoidance and negative reinforcement principles underlying superstitious behavior can provide 
an understandable basis for the origins and maintaining conditions of worry, cognitive processes at 
higher levels can eventually become functionally implicated. If chronic worriers come to believe 
that worry somehow has positive consequences, prevents bad things from happening, prepares them 
for the worst, or is a major distressing problem in and of itself, such underlying beliefs can 
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contribute further to the maintenance of worrisome process. Wells (1995) in particular has 
discussed the potential role of such "meta-worry" in changing normal worries into the kind of 
excessive and uncontrollable worry characteristic of generalized anxiety disorder. 
Worry as a Distraction from More Emotionally Laden Topics 
At a third level, it may be that people, especially for severe GAD individuals, worry about 
superficial things that serve to distract them from the real problem. In a certain sense, such a 
function appears to be inherent to any anxiety problem from the point of view of cognitive 
behavioral therapy. Its theoretical context suggests that moment-to-moment self-talk is merely a 
reflection of deeper belief structures and that what people report about what it is that they fear is 
really somewhat remote from the underlying fear. Thus it is that decatastrophizing method is used in 
an effort to help the client identify what that deeper fear might be. For example, a person who is 
afraid of giving speeches likely has brief thoughts and images that indicate possible poor 
performance and negative reactions by the audience. But such cognitions are negative only to the 
extent that they are associated with the potential for the occurrence of even more significant 
negative events that might follow from these. It is not so much another's negative evaluation that is 
feared but rather what might happen because of that evaluation (e.g., abandonment, being fired from 
a job). And each of these underlying fears may have deeper layers of catastrophe that drive their 
significance (e.g., loss of job might mean inability to care for oneself or family). We do know that 
worriers have much richer associative networks in this regard: They generate significantly more 
decatastrophization steps that do nonworriers (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). But in daily life, people 
are largely aware only of the more surface fears and rarely access thoughts about what the 
bottom-line catastrophe actually might be. 
GAD individuals also differ from nonanxious people on only one item among the 
above-mentioned rating scales regarding reasons for worrying: "Worrying about most of the things 
I worry about is a way to distract myself from worrying about even more emotional things, things 
that I don't want to think about." No direct evidence exists to support the validity of this report. 
However, if it is a valid observation, then other research has provided clues about what these 
underlying problems might be. First, GAD clients report the historical occurrence of more frequent 
traumas than do nonanxious people, yet they worry less about illness/death/injury themes than any 
other topic category (Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997; Roemer, Molina, Litz, & Borkovec, 
1997). So the worries that they now have may have originated from actual traumatic events that 
provided evidence that dangers exist in the world (and thus they need to anticipate other future 
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dangers) and may at the same time provide distraction from the even more emotionally disturbing 
events of their past. The second possible source of worry resides in the problematic relationships 
that GAD clients have had in the past and continue to have in their present interpersonal 
relationships (discussed later). In either of case, worrying about other things allows avoidance of the 
more threatening material. 
WORRY, HIGHER-ORDER CONDITIONING, AND THE SPREADING OF ANXIOUS 
MEANINGS 
The negative reinforcement of worrisome activity described above in its various versions 
would provide one mechanism for the strengthening of the activity and thus contribute to the 
maintenance of both the worrying itself and the anxious meanings associated with its topics. 
Another potential mechanism that contributes to further elaborations of anxious meaning was 
revealed in a laboratory investigation of higher-order conditioning among GAD clients and matched 
control participants (Thayer & Borkovec, 1995). In this procedure, one type of conditional stimulus 
preceded the presentation of neutral words, whereas a different type of conditional stimulus 
preceded the presentation of threatening words. Controls displayed habituation of the 
cardiovascular orienting response over all trials, but GAD clients did not. GAD clients showed 
defensive responses to threat words but not to nonthreat words, whereas controls had no defensive 
response to any word stimulus. Most significantly, GAD clients developed an orienting response to 
the conditional stimuli associated with the threat words. Thus, aversive words can yield classically 
conditioned attentional responses to previously neutral stimuli. This suggests that, as GAD clients 
engage in their constant negative internal dialogue, there are conditioning processes taking place 
that can be reasonably viewed as partly responsible for the development of their characteristic 
hypervigilance for threat and for the generalization of threatening cues. 
WORRY AND OTHER INFORMATION PROCESSING TASKS 
The past decade and a half has also given rise to a considerable amount of research on GAD 
and/or worry as they relate to other information processing phenomena. Much of this literature has 
been reviewed by Mathews (1990) and Mathews and MacLeod (1994). For example, GAD clients 
interpret ambiguous information in a negative way, and they predict greater likelihood of negative 
events happening in their futures. GAD clients also more rapidly identify and react to threat cues in 
their environments than nonanxious people, and they are not aware that they are doing so. Despite 
such identifications, they do not explicitly recall the threat stimuli seen, but implicit memory for the 
threats is enhanced. Thus, once again, we see in these memory results the avoidant properties of 
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worrisome activity. Most of the studies documenting memory effects such as these have used very 
brief exposures to threatening stimuli and/or active response requirements. Our own work has found 
the opposite effects in the above-mentioned higher-order conditioning study, wherein lengthy (8-s) 
exposures to the threat words and passive observation of them without a response requirement 
resulted in significantly greater explicit recall of the threat words than the nonthreat words for GAD 
clients than for their matched controls. 
The constant negatively valenced content of their cognitions and their attentional and 
interpretive biases toward threat suggest a kind of affective and cognitive inflexibility in GAD and 
worry. Further support for such rigidity has been found in two recent studies directly aimed at 
cognitive flexibility: GAD clients report lower levels of cognitive flexibility on a questionnaire 
designed to measure this construct (Hazlett-Stevens, 1997a), and worry induces lowered variability 
of topics mentioned in stream of consciousness reports compared to streams obtained during rest 
periods (Molina, Borkovec, Peasely, & Person, 1998). 
Finally, worry has been demonstrated to affect decision-making speed (Metzger, Miller, 
Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990). Chronic worriers take longer than nonworriers to decide whether 
a geometric stimulus does or does not match a training stimulus, increasingly so as the ambiguity of 
the test stimuli increases. This effect appears to be caused by worry: Nonworriers who worry for a 
few minutes before engaging in the task show the same effect. Also of interest is the fact that a 
relaxation induction preceding the task causes a normalization of the reaction times of chronic 
worriers. The delayed decision making associated with worry in this study has its more molar 
clinical representation in the frequent procrastination reported by our GAD clients in therapy. Such 
procrastination appears to be due to their fear of failure and its underlying social evaluative 
concerns. A recent study supported the intimate relationship between worry, procrastination, and 
evaluative concerns (Joormann & Stöber, 1997). High worriers reported more procrastination and 
higher perfectionism. Analyses of the individual dimensions of perfectionism (Frost, Marten, 
Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) showed that the correlation between worry and perfectionism was not 
due to higher personal standards but rather to increased concerns about mistakes and doubts about 
actions. Moreover, partial correlations indicated that these characteristics were specific for 
worriers: When controlling for anxiety and depression, the correlations with worry were hardly 
attenuated. When controlling for worry, however, the previously significant correlations of anxiety 
and depression with procrastination and perfectionism dropped to values around zero. 
WORRY AND DEPRESSION 
WORRY 11 
 
As is obvious from the review thus far, much of the worry literature has focused on its role in 
anxiety and anxiety disorders. Its inhibition of emotional processing may well be relevant, however, 
to any emotional problem wherein emotional processing is a necessary therapeutic event. That is, 
worry may maintain other emotional disorders, like panic disorder and obsessive compulsive 
disorder; its presence may maintain or strengthen the anxious meanings characteristic of these 
disorders and preclude therapeutic change during exposures to relevant fear stimuli. 
It appears that worry may also play a role in depression. Nolen-Hoeksema's (1996) research 
suggests that depressive rumination, which maybe similar in process and content to the worrisome 
thinking studied in GAD, is a factor that can maintain the depressive state. Moreover, laboratory 
inductions of worry with normal participants elicit both anxiety and depression in nearly equal 
amounts (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988). This finding raises some interesting possibilities. It may be 
that the study of worry can contribute to our understanding of the frequent coincidence of anxious 
and depressed states. For example, the content of worry may alternate between thoughts of future 
feared events (and thus generate anxiety) and thoughts of past negative events (and thus create 
depression). Additionally, a sense of hopelessness and hence depression may often occur in chronic 
worriers when they periodically realize that there is realistically nothing that can be done to avoid 
the many uncontrollable future events that they fear might happen. Irrespective of how worry can 
generate both anxiety and depression, the fact that it does suggests that it may be responsible for 
some instances of their co-occurrence. 
Although the review thus far has identified the variety of ways in which worry may involve 
interactions among several types of cognitive and affective processes, it turns out that worry is not 
solely an intrapersonal process. Moment-to-moment interactions with the environment, specifically 
one's interpersonal world, appear to play a highly significant role in the origins and maintenance of 
worry and GAD. 
WORRY AND INTERPERSONAL FACTORS 
GAD has been found to be associated with a particular form of insecure childhood 
attachment, and this developmental precursor relates quite closely with the kinds of interpersonal 
difficulties that they experience in current interpersonal relationships. Cassidy (1995) found that 
GAD clients recalled a greater degree of role reversal and enmeshment with their primary 
caregivers. Thus, in childhood they had to take care of, and anticipate dangers for, not only 
themselves but also their parent(s). Such a history could reasonably lead to an adulthood wherein 
the world is viewed as a potentially dangerous place and one's ability to cope is constantly 
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questioned. Intriguingly, the majority of adult GAD clients also fall into the overly nurturing cluster 
(Pincus & Borkovec, 1994) on the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Horowitz, Rosenberg, & 
Bartholomew, 1993). So many individuals with GAD may have learned as youngsters that taking 
care of others is necessary in order to receive love and approval, and they continue to do this in 
adulthood. Unfortunately, their overnurturance actually results in lessened likelihood of having 
their interpersonal needs met; they are often seen by others as intrusive in their caring attempts. 
PHYSIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WORRY AND GAD 
GAD and worry also appear to be strongly link to a distinctive psychophysiology whose 
characteristics may provide the foundation for other associated attentional and interpersonal 
maladaptive processes. GAD individuals do not show the typical sympathetic activation in response 
to threat or challenge as do individuals with the other anxiety disorders. Instead, they show a 
reduction in the range of physiological variability, leading Hoehn-Saric and colleagues 
(Hoehn-Saric & McLeod, 1988; Hoehn-Saric, McLeod, & Zimmerli, 1989) to conclude that they 
are chronically in a state of sympathetic inhibition. Given that GAD clients are constantly detecting 
threat, yet that threat cannot be avoided because it exists only in their minds and only in the future, 
fight-or-flight reactions serve no useful purpose and can only be suppressed. Worrisome thinking is 
one way to provide that suppression. These individuals' restricted range of peripheral physiological 
variability appears to be due to a vagal (parasympathetic) deficiency. GAD clients display lower 
parasympathetic tone at rest than do nonanxious individuals, and an induced state of worry can 
phasically create a reduction in vagal tone (Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer, 
Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996). The importance of parasympathetic deficiency in GAD becomes 
clearer when one considers other research that indicates that stronger vagal tone is significantly 
related to more adaptive attentional deployment (Porges, 1992; Richards, 1987).  
There may also be important brain wave characteristics associated with GAD. 
Understanding central nervous system contributions to anxiety has been based largely on global 
connections made in research studying negative emotionality and neuroticism. However, the EEG 
literature on anxiety has unfortunately used too broad of a definition of anxiety, leading to a 
confusing electrocortical picture which lacks specificity. More recent speculation using the basic 
two-dimensional structure of emotion suggests that valence (positive and negative) and activation 
(or arousal) are reflected in different cortical areas [cf. Osgood, Suci, & Tannebaum (1957) for a 
discussion of the two-factor theory of emotionality]. Current speculation suggests the frontal system 
of the cortex is sensitive to valance, whereas the more parietal areas are associated with activation 
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[cf. Pribram (1981) for a discussion of arousal and activation]. In terms of valance, for example, 
Davidson (1992) suggested negative affectivity and avoidance are associated with a right frontal 
cortical involvement, whereas positivity and approach are associated with left frontal cortical 
involvement. Emotional involvement in these studies is indexed through relative frontal hemi-
spheric EEG alpha. Others have emphasized parietal or temporal differences in the processing of 
emotional activity (e.g., Ray & Cole, 1985; Tucker, 1981). The literature further suggests a 
reciprocal relationship between frontal and parietal areas. 
In an evaluation of current anxiety research, Heller and her colleagues (Heller, Etienne, & 
Miller, 1995; Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997) suggested that part of the lack of clarity lies 
with the field's undifferentiated approach to anxiety that ignores differences in anxious arousal 
(panic) and anxious apprehension (worry). That is to say, studies exploring situations which 
increase arousal may result in differential cortical activation than those focused on worry or GAD. 
At present, few electrocortical studies have examined the arousal dimension (like that found in 
panic disorder), whereas the anxious apprehension dimension has been more thoroughly explored. 
Previous work examining anxious apprehension (e.g., Carter, Johnson, & Borkovec, 1986; Heller et 
al., 1997; Tucker, Antes, Stenslie, & Barnhardt, 1978; Tyler & Tucker, 1982) has found a greater 
frontal asymmetry involving left hemispheric activity in anxious apprehension groups. 
In a recent preliminary GAD study from our lab, we compared GAD clients prior to and 
following 14 sessions of therapy and with a control group. Comparing pre-therapy GAD and control 
individuals in each of the three tasks employed (baseline, relaxation, and worry) produced a picture 
of differential EEG activity between GAD and control individuals. It was found that GAD and 
control individuals both worry and relax in different ways, particularly in the EEG alpha bands (8 to 
13 Hz). This finding was consistent with the suggestion that GAD individuals engage less in 
imagery processes, supporting the earlier demonstrations of greater verbal and less imaginal activity 
in worry and GAD. Also, consistent with previous research, GAD clients displayed more left frontal 
beta activity during the worry task, whereas controls showed more theta. These differences suggest 
that controls are able to focus on the worry task in a manner different from the GAD individuals. 
Further, the EEGs of GAD clients appeared more like controls during the post-therapy laboratory 
session than they did during the pre-therapy session; brain wave patterns had normalized. 
Using an additional signal processing measure, that of coherence, i.e., the degree of shared 
activity between two signals, is mathematically similar to the correlation coefficient. The intriguing 
coherence picture that is emerging suggests that pre-therapy GAD clients show less cortical 
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inhibition (little time delay for the similar signal to appear throughout the cortex) in comparison to 
controls. Although additional research is required, these results may help to shed light on the finding 
that GAD is associated with pre attentive bias (e.g., shorter reactions times) and would suggest that 
GAD individuals have fewer inhibitory processes. Less cortical inhibition in our GAD group may 
help us to understand the excessive emotionality or thought processes seen in GAD. This finding is 
also consistent with speculation that the EEG seen in anxiety is driven by the limbic system in an 
undifferentiated manner. Following therapy, GAD clients showed more differentiated coherence 
patterns, particularly those representing longer distance connections, suggesting a return of 
inhibitory processes in the brain. Another potentially important coherence finding is that control 
and GAD groups showed differential directional patterns. For example, whereas control individuals 
displayed a pattern of EEG activity moving from more frontal areas of the brain to posterior areas, 
GAD clients showed the opposite directionality. This result suggests that controls have faster access 
to limbic system processes, whereas GAD clients delay such emotional influence on frontal lobe 
processes. Whatever the exact meaning of this directional differentiation between GAD and control 
groups, it is consistent with GAD individuals displaying less executive control of mental activities 
and may provide a basis for the uncontrollability of worry that is diagnostically characteristic of 
GAD. 
In contrast to the traditional signal processing procedures which decompose (through 
Fourier analysis or a similar technique) the component frequencies in the EEG and thus reflect a 
limited amount of information (one dimensional), the dynamic view suggests that a time series may 
be seen to reflect the marks of all other variables participating in the dynamics of the system. From 
this perspective, nonlinear dynamical models may well offer a characterization of behavior that is 
far richer than that obtained by classical measures. In our research, the derived EEG measure used is 
the pointwise or fractal dimension [cf. Lutzenberger, Elbert, Birbaumer, Ray, & Schupp (1992) for 
a description of the exact mathematical procedure]. This measure reflects information about the 
number of quasi-independent cell assemblies involved in the performance of a particular task 
(Lutzenberger, Preissl, & Pulvermuller, 1995). 
The nonlinear perspective suggests that the EEG reflects complex processes that appear 
random but may contain a hidden order. Part of the randomness comes from the brain's ability to 
shift abruptly and simultaneously from one activity pattern to another. It is suggested that contained 
within the brain's potential is the ability to organize itself in relation to internal and external input 
and be directed by that organization. Furthermore, it is suggested that the apparently chaotic 
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switching of processes may also contain a mechanism allowing the brain to move beyond a de-
terministic history and to initiate novel acts perceived as new ideas and creativity. In the language of 
chaos, it is the attractor that maintains or reflects a consistency of processing associated with a 
behavioral sequence. Thus, our task is to determine if a simple underlying structure can be seen to 
underlie the seemingly endless variation that one observes in the EEG. 
Fractal dimensionality measures (chaos) showed a differential pattern of activity from pre- to 
post-therapy for our GAD clients. Following therapy, the GAD group displayed lower 
dimensionality measures in the frontal areas during baseline measurements. Further, the GAD 
group showed greater differentiation as measured by the fractal dimension between relaxation and 
worry tasks following therapy. Again, this suggests that therapy helped the GAD individual to 
differentiate processing requirements rather than constantly respond with an anxious mindset. Al-
though the neuroscience literature is just beginning to discuss the functional significance of EEG 
chaos measures, these results are consistent with a picture of less cortical rigidity following therapy. 
These data overall suggest that consideration of a variety of psychophysiological measures are 
important for understanding anxiety processes. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Worry distinctively involves a predominance of verbal thought whose function appears to be 
the cognitive avoidance of threat. Thus, like the avoidant motor behavior present in the phobias, 
worry can be negatively reinforced and thus strengthened and maintained. This functional effect 
occurs because of its attenuation of somatic reactions to aversive images, its flight to abstractness, 
its superstitious association with the nonoccurrence of feared outcomes, and its possible service as a 
distracter from more distressing emotional material. Behaviorally, worry is associated with 
procrastination and rigid, maladaptive, interpersonal patterns often involving intrusive, overly 
nurturant behavior. Hypothetically, the delayed decision making in procrastination delays 
punishment for mistakes, and taking care of others prevents social criticism or interpersonal 
rejection. The occurrence of worry before or after threatening events lessens the emotional 
processing of those events and can lead to an increase in the anxious meanings surrounding those 
events. Worry also appears to contain mechanisms by which threatening meanings generalize to 
other stimuli: Chronic worriers become pre attentively biased toward detecting cues associated with 
threat, and higher-order conditioning involving worrisome words as the unconditional stimuli can 
generate increased vigilance to stimuli paired with those words. Recently discovered differences in 
autonomic nervous system and brain wave activity in GAD clients are beginning to offer glimpses 
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into the possible physiological substrates of many of the above psychological characteristics of 
worry. 
As can be seen from the above review, worry and its clinical manifestation in GAD involve 
rich and complex phenomena, just like any other human process. In worry, thought, attention, 
imagery, memory, affect, central and peripheral physiology, and behavior are all characteristically 
involved. Consequently, further experimental pursuit of this phenomenon is likely to teach us a 
great deal about the dynamical nature of worry and human anxiety. It is quite remarkable how much 
has been learned from empirical research on the topic in a relatively short period of time, but it is 
also clear that a complete understanding of this complex human process will require considerably 
more thought and investigation. The effort will be worthwhile. Upon greater understanding of the 
process of worry, we can build increasingly effective therapies for GAD and for the other anxiety 
and mood disorders wherein worry plays a significant role. 
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